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JOHN NORTON MOORE*

Contemporary Issues in
an Ongoing Debate: the Roles of
Congress and the President
in Fqreign Affairst
The Constitution, cautious in allocating authority between Congress and
the President in domestic matters, was an "invitation to struggle" in foreign
affairs.' The struggle was not long in coming. Washington's proclamation of
neutrality in 1793 triggered a sharp exchange between Hamilton, writing as
Pacificus, and Madison, writing as Helvidius. 2 Their debate about the
authority of the President in foreign affairs has since become a recurrent
theme in American constitutional history. The intensity of the debate has
been increased greatly by the strains of the post-World War 1Iperiod.
In January 1953 a proposed constitutional amendment was introduced in
the Senate by Senator Bricker on behalf of himself and 61 other senators.
As reported out of the Judiciary Committee the amendment would have
required legislation before international agreements could become internal
law-that is, it would have prevented international agreements from being
self-executing. It would also have reversed the rule of Missouri v. Holland
that a treaty may be an independent source of federal legislative authority,
and would have given Congress the authority to regulate Presidential
agreements with foreign powers. 3
*Counselor on International Law, Department of State; on leave, Piofessor of Law and
Director of the Graduate Program, University of Virginia School of Law.
tDelivered as an address at the Symposium on Consular Affairs, September 13)1972, in
Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this paper are the personal views.of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Government or any agency of the
Government.
_1
1
The phrase comes from Edward S. Corwin. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND
POWERS,
1787- 1957, 171 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
C
2
See Hamilton, The Letters of Pacificus, in THE FEDERALIST ON THE NEW
ONSTITUTION 405 (1857). and Madison, The Letters of Helvidius, id. 432.
3
For the flavor of the Bricker debate compare F. HOLMAN, STORY OF THE "BRICKER"
AMENDMENT (Committee for Constitutional Government, 1954), with THE BRICKER AMENDMENT: VIEWS OF DEANS AND PROFESSORS OF LAW (Committee for Defense of the Constitution By Preserving the Treaty Power, 1957).
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The impetus for the Bricker Amendment resulted from a combination of
concerns-some constitutionally erroneous. The principal concerns were,
first, that the constitutional authority for United States involvement in the
Korean War stemmed from the United Nations Charter rather than internal constitutional sources. And second, some worried that vigorous United
States participation in the United Nations would compromise national
sovereignty-particularly by domestic implementation of the Covenant on
Human Rights.
The Bricker Amendment had strong initial support, including the backing of the American Bar Association, the American Legion, and the United
States Chamber of Commerce. Despite this overwhelming support, the
Amendment was defeated by an aroused administration. It was never clear
how all of the concerns of the sponsors would have been served by the
Bricker Amendment, or that there had been an abuse of the treaty power.
Nineteen years later it is generally agreed that the Amendment would have
been a tragic mistake.
Just as an unpopular Korean War led to the Bricker Amendment, so too,
the Indo-China War has reopened old and new constitutional wounds.
But the current debate is far more pervasive than the Bricker debate. In
fact, it is the most sweeping and searching debate about the foreign affairs
power in the nation's history. There are at least three major issues in the
debate, all of which are the subject of pending legislation.
They are: first, the debate concerning the war powers, or the authority to
commit the nation to hostilities abroad; second, the debate concerning
executive privilege, or the authority of the President to withhold information from Congress; and third, the debate concerning the independent
authority of the President to enter into international agreements. It may be
well, at this point to discuss briefly the highlights of pending legislation in
each area and then make a few general observations on the debate as a
whole. First, the war powers debate:
The War Powers Debate
The focus of the debate is the Senate War Powers (Javits-Stennis) Bill. 4
The sponsors of this Bill are rightly concerned with strengthening the role
of Congress in war-peace decisions and in developing viable alternatives
4

See, "War Powers Legislation,"

EIGN

RELATIONS, 92D CONG.,

HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOR-

IST SESS. (1971);

"Congress,

the President, and the War

Powers,"

HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 9 1ST CONG. 2D SESS.

(1970). The War Powers Bill passed the Senate on April 13, 1972, by a vote of 68 to 16.
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for that role in an era in which declarations of war seem outmoded. 5 But
like the abortive Bricker Amendment, the Bill paints with too broad a
brush and, if enacted, could impair the constitutional balance.
The issue is not, as some supporters of the Bill have urged, one of
"restoring to the Congress and to the people a meaningful role on the
question of war or peace." There is no question that Congress must pass
on the commitment of United States armed forces to major foreign wars.
The issue is what legislation, if any, can best strengthen the roles of
Congress and the President.
The Javits-Stennis Bill would permit the use of armed forces in hostilities in only four categories of situations without a declaration of war, and
even in those situations would require Congressional authorization to sustain the use beyond thirty days. The vice of this approach is that it
atterhpts to freeze the circumstances in which the armed forces can be used
on Presidential authority-a "Maginot line" against the Presidency-and
that it assumes complete Congressional primacy, judgments which the
framers wisely avoided. There is a real need to preserve Presidential
flexibility in using force short of war, in defense against attacks on United
States' forces, and in emergency circumstances until Congress is able to
act. In each of these respects the War Powers Bill is dangerously rigid and
probably unconstitutional.
The Javits-Stennis Bill would prevent United States participation in an
emergency humanitarian mission for the protection of non-nationals, such
as the 1964 joint United States-Belgian rescue operation in the Congo.
More importantly, under present statutory authorization the Bill would
prevent the President from acting in an emergency to assist many friendly
nations, including Israel. Though the point has frequently been missed, the
Middle East Resolution could not serve under the War Powers Bill, as
statutory authorization for emergency assistance to Israel against an attack
by its neighbors. The Resolution authorizes use of the armed forces only
against aggression from countries "controlled by international communism."
Thus, under the Javits-Stennis Bill, even if Congress were in session at
the time of such an attack-an assumption which seems a frail reed for so
important an issue-it might still take up to five days before United States
forces could be committed even temporarily. By then the issue might be
moot. The Javits-Stennis Bill could also destroy Presidential flexibility in
providing United States' contingents to participate in U.N. peacekeeping
5

See the article by Senator Thomas F. Eagleton, Whose Power Is War Power?, 8 FOR.

POL. 23 (1972).
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operations. Finally, the Bill attempts to curtail Presidential authority to
defend against an attack on the United States beyond thirty days, unless
Congress specifically authorizes continued defense-a limitation which is
particularly suspect on constitutional grounds.
There are several alternatives which offer promise for improving our
constitutional processes without the rigidity of the Senate War Powers Bill.
The House has passed a joint resolution which would require the President
to submit a report to Congress when United States military forces are
deployed abroad or committed to armed conflict. 6 The report would include a statement of "the constitutional, legislative, and treaty provisions"
under which the President acted. 7 Such a reporting requirement would
increase the information flow to Congress, serve as an early warning of
creeping involvement, and require the President to justify his action. Another useful proposal is for the creation of a Joint Congressional Committee on'National Security to facilitate a continuing working relationship
between Congress and the President.
The Executive Privilege
Presidents throughout our history have asserted a constitutional privilege to withhold documents or information from Congress. In recent years,
they have also asserted a privilege to protect Presidential advisers from
compulsory process relating to the performance of their official duties.8
George Washington first enunciated the privilege to withhold information
and described it as extending to disclosure not "in the public interest."
Examples of the privilege with respect to Presidential advisers include
President Truman's assertion of the privilege for Presidential Assistant
John Steelman and President Eisenhower's similar assertion for Sherman
Adams.
Beginning with the Kennedy Administration, every President has agreed
that the privilege is one which must be asserted only on Presidential,
authority. Thus, the Nixon Administration operates under detailed procedures requiring Presidential review before invocation of executive privilege
by a department head. Assertions of privilege are rare; the usual practice is
simply to provide the information requested by Congress. In fact, the
General Counsel of the Department of Defense recently testified before
the Judiciary Committee that in fiscal year 1969 "an estimated 1,100
6

H.J. Res. I was passed on August 2, 1971, reprinted in "War Powers Legislation,"
Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., IstSess. (1971).
7
1d. Reference is to § 3 (B) of the resolution.
8
See "Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Information by the Executive," Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
92d cong., 1st sess. (1971).
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man-hours were expended by Department of Defense personnel in complying with Congressional requests for information." 9
Recently, Senator Fulbright introduced a bill which would require any
employee of the Executive branch claiming executive privilege to appear
personally and to present a statement signed by the President authorizing
invocation of the privilege. 10 An amended version of the bill would also
spell out details for obtaining Presidential authorization, and would require
the President to give in writing his reasons for invoking the privilege." The
Fulbright Bill was sharply debated in hearings held before the Judiciary
Committee last summer.
Without going too deeply into the intricacies of the debate over this Bill,
it should be said that there are genuine interests on both sides. Congress
has an interest in obtaining a maximum of information to enable it to
perform its investigative and legislative functions. The President has an
interest in preserving the integrity of the advisory process. The need is for
development of responsive criteria which will reconcile these interests.
Criteria which might be explored as a basis for executive privilege include
the following:
(1) Whether release of the information might compromise the integrity
of the advisory process by deterring candid advice or criticism
within the Executive branch:
(2) whether release of the information might invade an individual's right
of privacy as, for example, by compromising the confidentiality of
personnel files;
(3) whether release of the information might undercut ongoing efforts at
international negotiations;
(4) whether release of the information might compromise information
provided in confidence by a foreign nation or an international organization; and
(5) whether release of the information might seriously damage the national security.
The Authority of the President to Make Executive Agreements
The Bricker debate raised a potpourri of issues concerning the treaty
9

Statement of J. Fred Buzhardt. General Counsel, Department of Defense, reprinted in
"Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Information by the Executive," Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., at 443 (197 1).
1
°Senator Fulbright's bill, S. 1125, was introduced on March 5, 197 1, and debated in the
Judiciary Committee that summer. See id. at 8-9.
"For the amended version of the bill, see id. at 10- 14.
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power. These included the extent to which treaties could avoid specific
constitutional limitations, whether treaties should be self-executing, the
nature of the treaty power as a source of independent federal legislative
authority, and the authority of Congress to regulate international agreements entered into by the President. In contrast, the present debate focuses largely on the independent authority of the President to make international agreements, particularly agreements perceived as involving mili12
tary commitments.
In 1967 the Senate passed the National Commitments Resolution indicating that "it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by
the United States to a foreign power ... [only] results from affirmative
action taken by the Executive and Legislative branches of the United
States ... "13 The hearings made it clear that the Resolution was prompted
by a Vietnam-linked concern about United States overcommitment. But it
was never clear that the problem was one of overcommitment by executive
agreement or that the Resolution was responsive to the Vietnam situation.
I am aware of no NATO-like defense commitment with a foreign nation
which was concluded by executive agreement: all of the nation's present
commitments to some 42 countries were made by treaty. And both the
SEATO Treaty and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution would have met the
4
requirements of the National Commitments Resolution.'
Early in 1972, hearings were held by the Foreign Relations Committee
on whether the military bases agreements concluded with Portugal and
Bahrain during December of 197 1, were within the President's authority or
whether they should have been submitted to the senate under the treaty
power.15 The Foreign Relations Committee favorably reported a resolution
that these agreements should have been submitted to the Senate as treaties,
and it subsequently attached an amendment to this effect in the Foreign
Assistance Act.' 6 In April and May of 1972, the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted hearings on
12See "Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress," Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 92d cong. st sess. (197 1); "Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress," REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 92D CONG.
2D SESS. (Report No. 92-591, Jan. 19, 1972).
' 3 For the text of the 1967 "National Commitments Resolution" passed by the Senate (S.
Res. 85),
see "Legislation on Foreign Relations" (Joint Committee Print, 1972) at 830.
14
See generally, "Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad," REPORT TO THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE
MENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD, 91ST CONG. 2D SESS. (1970).

1

ON SECURITY AGREE-

sSee, "Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain," REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE
214, 92D CONG. 2D SESS. (Feb. 17, 1972).

ON

FOREIGN RELATIONS TO ACCOMPANY S. RES.
16

For the test of S. Res. 214, see "Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements,"
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 348 (1972).
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executive agreements. 17 The bill contemplated in their deliberations would
have required all executive agreements to be tabled with Congress for sixty
days, and they would then take effect only if not disapproved by Congress
during that period. 18
At the outset, we should be clear about what the issue is. It is not the
internationalauthority of treaties as opposed to executive agreements. In
international law, treaties and executive agreements are interchangeable:
an oral agreement may be just as enforceable as the most solemn treaty.' 9
The issue is rather the constitutional authority of the President, the President and the Senate, or the President and the Congress to enter into
international agreements.
Article 11, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the President
"shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to
make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur." This
Executive-Senate treaty procedure may be used to conclude any international agreement, provided that it does not infringe on the specific guarantees of the Constitution. Though the records of the Constitutional Convention demonstrate that the treaty power was deliberately entrusted to
the President and the Senate jointly, there is nothing in the records which
defines what is meant by a treaty, or that forecloses alternative constitutional procedures for concluding international agreements. 20
In fact, by differentiating in Article I, Section 10 between treaties and
agreements, and mentioning only treaties in Article II, Section 2, the
Constitution seems to imply a residual federal power to enter into international agreements other than by the treaty process. More important, the
specific grants of authority to Congress and the President, as well as any
inherent foreign affairs power, strongly suggest for their effectuation an
included authority to enter into international agreements. 2 ' For example,
the grant of authority to Congress to establish postal services implies for its
171d.
"8 For the text of S. 596 ("the Case Bill"), see id. at 347.
19 According to the Harvard Research in International Law "the distinction between
so-called 'executive agreements' and 'treaties' is purely a constitutional one and has no
international significance." HARVARD RESEARCH, Law of Treaties: Draft Convention, with
Comment (1935), reprinted in 29 AM. J. INT'L L. suPP. No. 4, 652, 697. See also McDougal
& Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executiveor PresidentialAgreements: Interchangeable
Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L. J. 181-351, 534-615; reprinted in M.
& ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 422-23 (1960). The form
chosen may make an international political difference, however, since treaties normally signal
a long-lasting
or major commitment.
2
°See generally 1-111 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 (1911). See also THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 2; L. RODGERS, CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1944); C. RosSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966).
21
See, e.g. McDOUGAL & LANS, supra note 19, at 448-60.
MCDOUGAL
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effectuation, authority to authorize and approve international agreements
for postal cooperation. As early as 1792 the Congress endorsed this interpretation by delegating authority to the Postmaster General to conclude
22
international postal agreements.
Whatever the original intent, one hundred and eighty years of constitutional practice and repeated rulings of the Supreme Court have established beyond doubt the constitutional validity of executive agreements.
.Professor Myres McDougal has concluded after the most thorough
analysis of the agreement power to date:
No illusion as to the exclusiveness of the treaty-making clause, that is at all
affected by intimations of reality, can survive the fact that of the "nearly two
thousand international instruments" entered into by the United States between 1789
and 1939 "only some eight hundred were made by the treaty
23
process."
This reality seems even more compelling today. As of January 1, 1969,
the United States was party to 909 treaties and 3,973 executive agreements, or more than four executive agreements for every treaty. 24 And
between 1955 and April 1972, the United States entered into 5,591 executive agreements sufficiently important to be published in the official
series. 25 It is evident from these figures that executive agreements are an
indispensible tool of foreign relations.
Corwin summarizes the state of the present law when he says the
essential question "is not whether the President can constitutionally enter
into executive agreements with other governments-a point universally
6e
conceded-but what scope these may today validly take.'
In the absence of more definitive guidance in the record of the Constitutional Convention, a variety of tests have been suggested for delimiting
the scope of authority to conclude executive agreements. At one extreme,
it has been asserted that executive agreements are limited to unimportant
as opposed to important agreements.2 7 But constitutional practice will not
221 Stat. 236 (1792). The constitutionality of this procedure was upheld by Solicitor-General
Taft in 1890. See 19 oPs. ATTY. GEN. 520 (1890).
23
McDougal & Lans, supra note 19, at 474-74.
24
These figures are based on a Department of State estimate discussed by Professor Ruhl
J.Bartlett in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See HEARINGS, supra
note 12, at 14, 16.
25See Addendum to the compilation of January 10, 1969, entitled International Agreements Other Than Treaties, 1946- 1968 Classified According to the Legal Authority on the
Basis of Which They Were Made or Became Effective to cover the period to April 1972.
(Office
of the Legal Adviser, Department of State), at 39.
26
E. COWRIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 40 (1944).
27
This test seems implicit in Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54
YALE L.J. 616 (1945). Sometimes it is said that this distinction stems from an international
distinction between "public treaties" and "agreements" set out in the writings of Emmerich de
Vattel and known to the framers. For the critical appraisal of this theory, see McDougal &
Lans, supra note 19, at 460-75.
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support a distinction that only unimportant agreements may be concluded
as executive agreements. As Professor Quincy Wright pointed out in 1944:
[T]he United States annexed Texas and Hawaii, ended the first world war,

joined the International Labor Organization, the Universal Postal Union and
the Pan American Union, settled over ten billion dollars worth of post-World
War I debts, acquired Atlantic naval bases in British territory during World
War 11, acquired all financial claims of the Soviet Union in the United States,

joined the United Nations pledging itself not to make separate peace in World
War I1 and to accept the Atlantic Charter, submitted over a score of cases to
international arbitration, and modified the tariff in numerous reciprocal trade
agreements, by means other than the treaty-making process. 28

To Professor Wright's list might be added the 1898 peace protocol with
Spain by which Spain agreed to cede Puerto Rico to the United States, the
four-power agreement of 1949 ending the Berlin Blockade, the armistics
29
agreement ending the Korean War, and so on.
At the other extreme, some of the most thoughtful constitutional observers, including Professor Quincy Wright, have urged that the constitutional
authority to conclude executive agreements is plenary, stemming from the
inherent foreign affairs power of the Executive. 3" This theory of inherent
Presidential authority to conclude international agreements receives support from the opinion of the Supreme Court in the famous Curtiss-Wright
case. 31 Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, indicated that the
foreign affairs power of the nation is inherent, and does not depend on a
32
specific constitutional grant of authority.
One difficulty with the inherent Presidential authority test is that it
seems to assume, without adequate explanation, an equivalence between
inherent federal power and inherent Presidential power. More important,
the test ignores the strong interest in shared responsibility underlying the
separation of powers -an interest which should control in the absence of
crisis or other functional basis for preferring Presidential authority.
The preferable test, and one which seems to command the greatest
contemporary support, is that the scope of authority to conclude executive
28

Wright, The United States and InternationalAgreements, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 343

(1944). (Professor Wright's 1944 reference to the United Nations is to the Allied wartime
coalition, not to the subsequent organization itself which the United States joined by treaty.)
2See, Levitan, Executive Agreements: A Study of the Executive in the Control of the
Foreign Relations of the United States, 35 ILL. L. REV. 365 (1940), and International
Agreements Other Than Treaties, 1946-1968: A List With Citations of Their Legal Bases

(Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, 1969). One controversial example from the
economic side is the International Antidumping Code. See Senator Russell B. Long's article,
United States Law and the International Anti-Dumping Code, 3
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464 (1969).

In this case, only the United States, among the eighteen signatories, did not submit the
agreement
for legislative approval.
30
Wright. supra note 28, at 349. See also W. MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTs

31

363 (1944).

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
1d. at 318.

32
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agreements depends on the constitutional authority of the President and
the Congress, to deal with the subject matter of the agreement in question. 33 That is, an agreement concluded solely on Presidential authority
must be within the President's power as Chief Executive of the nation,
Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, diplomatic representative of
the nation, or some other general Presidential power. And an agreement
concluded with the authorization or approval of Congress must be within
the general legislative competence of Congress.
This subject matter test seems implicit in the Department of State
"Circular 175 Procedure," which is the internal procedure used by the
Department for determining the form an international agreement should
take. 34 It is also the test most in accord with constitutional practice, the
constitutional basis for executive agreements, and the nation's general
tradition of separation of powers. Most important, since a subject matter
test reflects the existing functional division between Congress and the
Executive, it is more responsive to the reasons for preferring congressional
or Presidential authority. Adopting the subject matter test, the scope of
authority to conclude international agreements is as follows:
1. The President with the concurrence of two-thirds of the senators
present may conclude an international agreement on any subject
genuinely a concern of foreign relations. Such an agreement is a
treaty;
2. The President may conclude an international agreement expressly or
impliedly authorized by a valid treaty. Such an agreement is an
executive agreement pursuant to treaty (one commentator refers to
35
such agreements as treaties);
3. The President may conclude an international agreement expressly or
impliedly authorized by prior legislation or subsequently approved by
Congress on any subject within congressional legislative competence
and genuinely a concern of foreign relations. Such an agreement is an
executive agreement pursuant to legislation.
33

This test seems to be the one adopted by, among others, Corwin and McDougal &
Lans.34See E. CORWIN, supra note 26, at 44; McDougal & Lans, supra note 19, at 475-504.
Department of State Circular 175, currently undergoing revision, provides with respect
to the "Exercise of the Executive Agreement-making Power:"
Executive agreements are not to be used when the subject matter is of such a nature that
it should be covered by a treaty. The executive agreement form is used only for
agreements which fall into one or more of the following categories:
a. Agreements which are made pursuant to or in accordance with existing legislation or a
treaty;
b. Agreements which are made subject to congressional approval or implementation, or
c. Agreements which are made under and in accordance with the President's constitutional power.
35See McDougal & Lans, supra note 19, at 433-35.
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4. The President may conclude an international agreement solely on
Presidential authority on any subject within his independent authority
and genuinely a concern of foreign relations. Such an agreement is an
executive agreement pursuant to the constitutional authority of the
36
President.
As is evident from the variety of constitutional procedures for concluding international agreements, executive agreements as such, should not
be confused with those few executive agreements concluded solely on
Presidential authority. The overwhelming bulk of executive agreements are
concluded pursuant to prior or subsequent legislative or treaty authorization. For example of the 5,591 executive agreements concluded between
1955 and April 1972, only 64-or a fraction over one percent-were
37
concluded solely under the independent authority of the President.
Conclusion
To close this survey of the current issues, a few general observations:
First, in considering executive agreements, as well as other issues in the
current debate about the foreign affairs power, we might profitably heed
Dean Acheson's timeless reminder that "(t)he central question is not
whether Congress should be stronger than the President, or vice versa, but
how the Congress and the President can both be strengthened to do the
pressing work that falls to each to do and to both to do together." '38
The President should remember that congressional support is a prerequisite for a successful foreign policy. The President is dependent on
Congress for legislative implementation and appropriations, he can in some
areas be legislatively curbed by Congress, and above all, he must maintain
a national consensus which only strong congressional support can assure.
Moreover, Congress can be a helpful forum for obtaining new ideas refining old policies.
These realities suggest the importance of vigorous consultation with
Congress and of keeping Congress informed of Executive policies fully and
candidly-even if some lumps must be taken in return. The President
needs Congress: an overbearing Executive, disdainful of exposure of his
policies to the crucible of congressional debate, may pay heavily. The
unnecessary use of the distracting and ambiguous attacks on American
ships in the Gulf of Tonkin as the occasion for the principal authorizing
legislation for the Indo-China War provides an example.
36

For a similar differentiation, see id.
See Addendum, supra note 25, at 39. Presumably, this figure does not include informal
agreements concluded in the day-to-day operation of the Executive branch and not officially
reported in TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.
38
D. ACHESON, A CITIZEN LOOKS AT CONGRESS 56 (1957).
37
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Second, the Congress should remember that there are good reasons for
Presidential leadership in foreign affairs. These include the facility of the
Executive to act with speed and decisiveness, his capacity to respond with
a high or low profile, to act with negotiating responsiveness-and secrecy
when genuinely required-and to have access to more complete information. The recent China initiative by President Nixon illustrates all of these
Presidential attributes.
Finally, as the only elected official responsible to the nation as a whole,
the President has a unique responsibility and capacity for a unified foreign
policy. He may, for example, be more aware of the linkages between
different foreign policy programs. This is not to suggest that Congress
should forego vigorous debate of important foreign policy issues or suspend its close scrutiny of possible Executive usurpation of the congressional role in foreign affairs. It is to suggest that Congress should curtail
Presidential flexibility only where there are compelling reasons for doing
so.
Third, we must remember that these issues transcend the immediate
Indo-China debate. The present suggestions for curtailing Executive power
are largely supported by liberals against a more conservative President. In
contrast, the Bricker debate was triggered by conservatives against a more
liberal President. The enduring issue is not the comparative wisdom of
Congress and the President at any particular moment in time, but how
authority in foreign affairs can be divided between Congress and the
President as institutions, in a manner which will optimize the functional
strength of both. On this issue the key is not the triumph of either Pacificus
or Helvidius, but is instead a quest for reasonable lines.
Fourth, we should remember that the framers did not, except in the most
general terms, engrave the lines of authority on the Constitution. This lack
of detail suggests a variety of corollaries. One is that in a real sense we are
constitutional framers and should approach the task with the thoroughness
befitting it. A second is that generalizations such as separation of powers
offer little guidance: there is no escape from the painful task of hammering
out a workable balance, issue by issue. And a third corollary is that we
should be cautious in attempting overly specific determination of the issues, lest we be caught in a web of hindsight.
As a final point, it is especially troubling to sense the strength of the
feeling in Congress-quite honestly held-that the power of the legislative
branch in foreign affairs has gradually eroded through the activities of the
Presidency, and that the task is somehow to recapture it.
There is truth in this claim, particularly with respect to the extreme
assertions of five or six years ago that the Executive has independent
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 7, No. 4
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authority to wage major wars abroad. But like all generalizations, this one
is only partly true. And unlike many other generalizations, it has the power
to buttress a Congressional crusade. Such a crusade- if undertaken against
a Vietnam-weakened Presidency-could dangerously redraw the lines in
foreign affairs.
In 1961, Senator Fulbright wrote:
The source of an effective foreign policy under our system is Presidential
power. This proposition, valid in our own time, is certain to become more,
rather than less compelling in the decades ahead... .a
Senator Fulbright's statement is too general to answer the range of
specific issues which we must now address. But there is a truth in it which
we must not forget.

39

Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century Under an 18th-Century
Constitution, 47 CORNELL L. Q. 1, 2 (1961).
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